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PATENT MARKETS: A Framework

for

Evaluation
Michael J. Burstein*
INTRODUCTION

Patents have become financial assets. They are valued like securities, 1
traded like stocks,2 and modeled as options. 3 Our discourse about patents
increasingly draws from finance. Firms whose business models depend on
patent assertion explain that they are providing "liquidity" to the patent
market. 4 Those on the other side, which engage in collective defense, talk
about using the market to mitigate "patent risk. " 5 Commentators who
ordinarily take very different positions about the merits of our current patent
system seem to agree that we should make patent markets more efficient. 6
But neither they nor most others ask the logically prior question: should
there be robust patent markets at all? This Essay provides a roadmap for
answering that question. Taking seriously the analogy between patent
markets and financial markets, I demonstrate that there are numerous
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Benkler, Dan Burk, Colleen Chien, Brett Frischmann, Zachary Gubler, Mark Lemley, Robert
Merges, Josh Sarnoff, Ted Sichelman, Alex Stein, Susannah Barton Tobin, Melissa Wasserman,
and Chuck Yablon for helpful comments and conversations. I am also grateful to participants at
the 2015 Law and Entrepreneurship Association Retreat, the 2015 NYU Tri-State Region IP
Workshop, the 2014 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference, the 2014 National Business Law
Scholars Conference, the 2015 PatCon: The Patent Conference, and workshops at St. John's,
DePaul, and Cardozo for their feedback. Michele Aronson provided outstanding research
assistance.
1.
See, e.g., Maayan Pere1, An Ex Ante Theory of Patent Valuation: Transforming Patent
Quality into Patent Value, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 148, 161-70 (2014) (describing common patent
valuation techniques).
2.
See, e.g., Amy L. Landers, Liquid Patents, 84 DENY. U.L. REV. 199, 207-11 (2006).
3.
See, e.g., Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Patents as Options, in PERSPECTIVES ON
COMMERCIALIZAING INNOVATION 303, 303 (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2012);
Christopher A. Cotropia, Describing Patents as Real Options, 34 J. CORP. L. 1127, 1128 (2009).
4.
Nathan Myhrvold, The Big Idea: Funding Eureka!, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar. 1, 2010,
https://hbr.org/2010/03/the-big-idea-funding-eureka.
5.
RPX Corp., RPX R&D, RPX RATIONAL PATENT, http://www.rpxcorp.com/rpxservices/rpx-rd/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2015) (describing market-based approach to
"rationaliz[ing] patent transactions and reducing NPE cost and risk").
6.
Mark A. Lemley & Nathan Myhrvold, How to Make a Patent Market, 36 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 257,258 (2007).
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circumstances in which even well-functioning patent markets will fail to
promote innovation. Because "promot[ ing] the [p]rogress of [s] cience and
useful [a]rts,"7 rather than achieving efficiency in the purchase and sale of
patent assets, is the ultimate goal of the patent system, liquid markets
cannot be a panacea. We therefore need to have a different conversation
about such markets, in which we seek empirical data about when their
operation is socially beneficial, and in which we consider their merits
alongside other proposals for patent reform.
This Essay starts that conversation by way of a thought experiment.
Imagine, if you will, a market for patents that looked roughly like the stock
market or, perhaps more analogously, the real estate market. Such a market
would have several characteristics. 8 It would be liquid. There would be a
sufficient number of willing buyers and sellers that any person wishing to
transact over a patent could do so. It would be transparent, so that market
participants have access to pricing and other data. And it would have
relatively low transaction costs. Such a market may facilitate patent
transactions at market clearing prices. But markets are also prone to pricing
distortions 9 and moral hazard, 10 and a patent market would be no exception.
Patent markets might therefore fail optimally to allocate the underlying
technological asset. In this Essay, I use the thought experiment described
above to assess systematically the cases for and against patent markets. I
conclude that, like much in patent law, the effects of robust secondary
markets are likely to vary with specific technological and business contexts.
But at the very least, there are enough reasons to be skeptical of patent
markets that we should proceed with caution when invoking them in policy
debates about the contours of the patent system.
More importantly, patent markets are not likely to provide a complete
solution to the problems associated with the modern patent system-too
many patents of dubiuµs quality and scope. Even to the extent that patent
markets function as second-best mechanisms to alleviate some of the
problems of patent quality, we ought not to give up on policies aimed at
improving patent quality directly.

7.
8.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
See generally FRANK J. FABOZZI ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND
INSTITUTIONS 5-6 (4th ed. 2010).
9.
See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488-90 (1970).
10. See, e.g., Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57
UCLA L. REV. 183, 189 (2009).
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The kind of robust, liquid patent markets that this. Essay describes do not
yet exist.11 But they are beginning to emerge.12 Consider just a few
examples of recent patent transactions. In 2011, a consortium led by Apple
and Microsoft purchased over 6000 patents from Nortel Networks, a
bankrupt telecommunications firm, for $4.5 billion. 13 Three years later, that
consortium sold 4000 of those patents to a syndicate of thirty different
companies in a deal valued at $900 million and brokered by RPX, a patent
intermediary. 14 Patents appeared to drive Google's 2011 purchase of
Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion, which included a portfolio of 24,500
pending or issued patents. 15 In 2012, Alcatel-Lucent refinanced $2.1 billion
in debt in a collateralized offering secured primarily by its patent portfolio. 16
Heeding a popular call to "tap their patent portfolios for the hidden asset
values and revenue streams that lie within," 17 many companies have spun
off new entities whose sole purpose is to hold and monetize their patent

11. See Andrei Hagiu & David B. Yoffie, The New Patent Intermediaries: Platforms,
Defensive Aggregators, and Super-Aggregators, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 45, 45--46 (2013) (noting
that "[t]here is no eBay, Amazon, New York Stock Exchange, or Kelley's Blue Book equivalent
for patents," and describing patent markets as "[i]nefficient and illiquid").
12. Some refer to this emerging market as a "secondary market" for patents. See, e.g.,
FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 58 (2011) [hereinafter FTC REPORT]. That may be something of a
misnomer. In finance, secondary markets are those which arise to facilitate the purchase and
sale of securities after they have been issued in the primary market. Because a patent issues to
an applicant rather than to a bidder in a market, there is no primary market for patents.
Nevertheless, the term may be used interchangeably to signify purchases and sales among those
other than the applicant to whom the patent initially issues.
13. See M.G. Siegler, How Apple Led the High-Stakes Patent Poker Win Against Google,
Sealing
Ballmer's
Promise,
TECHCRUNCH
(Jul.
9,
2011),
http://techcrunch.com/2011/07 /09/vesper/.
14. See Scott Graham, With Rockstar-RPX Deal, 'Tis the'S'easonfor Patent Peace, THE
RECORDER
(Dec.
23,
2014),
http://www.rpxcorp.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/2/2015/03/Recorder_ Rockstar.pdf.
15. Mikael Ricknas, Google Buys Motorola Mobility for US$I2.5 Billion, PC WORLD,
http://www.pcworld.com/article/23 8043/google_buys_motorola_mobility_for_us_ 12_ 5_billion.
html (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). Indeed, following that acquisition, Google sold off all of
Motorola's businesses except for its patent portfolio. Jeff Roberts, Google Paid $4B for Patents:
Why the Motorola Deal Worked Out Just Fine, GIGAOM (Jan. 30, 2014, 5:15 AM),
https:// gigaom.com/2014/01 /30/google-paid-4b-for-patents-why-the-motorola-deal-worked-outjust-fine/.
16. See Dana Cimilluca & Sam Schechner, Alcatel-Lucent Secures $2.I Billion Debt
Financing,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Dec.
14,
2012,
9:47
AM),
http://www. wsj .com/articles/SB 10001424127887323981504578177982789220970.
17. KEVIN G. RlvETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE Arne: UNLOCKING THE
HIDDENVALUEOFPATENTS 28 (2000).
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portfolios. 18 Others have sold their patents outright either to other operating
companies or a whole new class of enterprises 19-patent assertion entities;
more pejoratively, patent trolls-that "purchase patents, and then sell or
license them as assets whose values are based on the amount of licensing
fees" or litigation recoveries they can obtain. 2° Finally, intermediaries have
arisen to facilitate these transactions. Ocean Torno, for example, links
buyers and sellers of patents through an auction process, 21 while a company
called IPXI purported to create "the world's first financial exchange that
facilitates non-exclusive licensing and trading of intellectual property (IP)
rights with market-based pricing and standardized terms." 22 In short, patents
no longer are used solely to exclude competitors; instead, they frequently
are bought and sold by persons or entities other than the inventors whose
work falls within the patent claims.
More important, the growth of this market is leading to a significant shift
in the discourse, in which patents are treated not as classic incentives for
innovation, but as financial assets. After all, they meet the typical definition
of financial assets-they are transferable "claim[s] to future cash flow[s]." 23 ,The right to exclude conferred by a patent can generate cash for its holder
when the underlying subject matter is licensed to others or the right to
exclude is enforced through litigation. To be sure, the cash flow associated
with any given patent is highly uncertain. 24 It depends on the vagaries of
licensing negotiations or litigation. But valuation amidst significant

18. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2137-38 nn.89-94 (2013) (collecting examples).
19. See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 461 (2012)
(concluding that most NPE patents came from operating companies selling parts of their
portfolios).
20. FTC REPORT, supra,note 12, at 60.
21. See Press Release, Ocean Torno, Ocean Torno to Re-Enter Live Intellectual Property
(IP) Auction Market (Oct. 6, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.oceantomo.com/2014/10/06/oceantomo-re-enter-live-intellectual-property-ip-auction-market/.
22. See Press Release, Intellectual Property Exchange International, Inc., Intellectual
Property Exchange International Attracts Leading Global Corporations, Universities, National
Laboratories as New Members (May 25, 2012), https://www.ipxi.com/news-events/news/pressreleases/69-ipxi-attracts-leading-members.html. IPXI since proved unsuccessful, closing in
March 2015.
23. FABOZZIET AL., supra note 8, at 2.
24. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 76
(2005) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents] ("There are two fundamental
dimensions of uncertainty: 1) uncertainty about the commercial significance of the invention
being patented, and 2) uncertainty about the validity and scope of the legal right being
granted.").
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uncertainty is what much of finance tries to accomplish, 25 and a number of
methods have been developed to assign a monetary value to a patent. 26
Much of the academic commentary on these developments has focused
on how to improve the operation of this nascent market. Nathan Myhrvold
and Mark Lemley, for example, argue that price transparency is the sine qua
non of a sustainable market and that in order to "make a patent market,"
patent assignment and license terms should be subject to mandatory
disclosure. 27 Michael Risch argues in a similar vein that the securities laws
ought to apply to patent portfolios. 28
In the public discourse about "patent trolls," many entities accused of
trolling behavior defend their activities on the ground that they are trying to
establish a patent market. Nathan Myhrvold, the CEO of Intellectual
Ventures, the largest patent aggregation firm, describes his firm as
"trying ... to create a capital market for inventions." 29 "To organize such a
market," he says, "you need the liquidity that only investors can provide." 30
Several academic authors have made similar claims, observing that patent
assertion entities really are intermediaries in the patent market. 31 As such,
they "make the patent market more efficient by realigning market
participant incentives, making patents more liquid, and clearing the patent
market."32 Microsoft summarized the case in its recent comments to the
FTC:
25. See STEPHEN A. Ross ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE 49 (2d ed. 1990).
26. See infra notes 100-108 and accompanying text.
27. Lemley & Myhrvold, supra note 6, at 258-59. This position is consistent with broader
calls to improve the notice function of the patent system. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J.
MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT
RISK 235-53 (2008).
28. Michael Risch, Patent Portfolios as Securities, 63 DUKE L.J. 89, 93 (2013) [hereinafter
Risch, Patent Portfolios] ("[T]his Article proposes that patent portfolios, but perhaps not
individual patents, should be treated like securities to help patent markets behave more like
public securities markets.").
29. Myhrvold, supra note 4.
30. Id.
31. See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 11, at 46; James F. McDonough III, Comment, The

Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea
Economy, 56 EMORYL.J. 189, 190 (2008).
32. McDonough, supra note 31; see also B. Zorina Khan, Trolls and Other Patent
Jnventions: Economic History and the Patent Controversy in the Twenty-First Century, 21 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 825, 835 (2014) ("[I]n many [historical examples], 'speculators' invested in
patents with the sole intention of profiting from the margins of price differentials, without
participating in either inventive activity or manufacturing, much as a financial investor might
trade in a share in a company in secondary and tertiary markets. In so doing, they added to the
liquidity and depth of the market and enabled others to minimize their exposure to risk.");
Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the "Patent Troll" Rhetoric, 47
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PAEs (and patent aggregators more generally) have made
significant strides in adding liquidity, market clearing, and risk
transfer mechanisms to the patent market. Their market
participation by serving as "ready and willing" buyers of patents
helps manage the supply of patents and provides liquidity to the
patent market. Patent intermediaries' expertise in evaluating patent
assets also leads to better information, more rational pricing, and
lower transaction costs in the secondary market. 33

These observations and arguments are likely correct so far as they go. It
is self-evident that more willing buyers create greater liquidity for patents,
and that improving the notice function of the patent system will reduce the
information costs associated with patent transactions. In short, there are
many steps that policymakers and private sector actors can take to create
more robust, liquid patent markets. But should they? There appears to be an
underlying normative premise to these arguments: that those robust, liquid
patent markets would be socially beneficial. That premise has, for the most
part, 34 gone unexamined. 35
To challenge that premise, I draw upon the financial economics literature
to develop the analogy between patent markets and financial markets. This
analogy ultimately offers a mixed bag. There are some circumstances in
which patent markets are likely to be socially desirable, but others in which
they may be prone to well understood market failures. I begin by
articulating the relevant normative standard, because transactional
efficiency in itself is neither the goal of the patent system nor of financial
markets. Indeed, efficient markets that match buyers and sellers of a
particular asset are not usually thought to be ends in themselves; instead
they are instrumentally useful when they serve other social goals, such as
allocating useful goods and services or mitigating risk. Because the primary
normative goal of the patent system is generally thought to be innovation
promotion, the efficacy of patent markets ought to be judged not simply by

CONN. L. REV. 435, 452 (2014) ("[P]atent licensing companies also engage in the all-important
function of market-making by adding liquidity to patents and reducing information asymmetries
between buyers and sellers.").
33. Jason Albert, Comments of Microsoft Corporation on the Impact of Patent Assertion
Entity Activities on Innovation and Competition, MICROSOFT CORP. 5-6 (2012),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0042.pdf.
34. A prominent exception is Robert P. Merges, The Trouble With Trolls: Innovation,
Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583 (2009). Merges argues
that there is no justification for a market in socially wasteful patent transactions. Id. at 1588. See
infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
35. E.g., Risch, Patent Portfolios, supra note 28, at 95 (expressly reserving the question).
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the extent to which they match buyers and sellers, but by the extent to
which they promote or retard innovation.
With this analogy in mind, there are two potential functions that robust
patent markets can play. First, they can allocate technology. When patents
correlate with technologically useful knowledge, markets can enable real
technology transfer between inventors who need capital or skills and
developers or commercializing agents who possess those things. That in
turn has innumerable benefits because it allows for faster, better
commercialization of new technologies. But where the fit between patents
and technologies is imperfect, there is ample room for strategic behavior. A
liquid market may exacerbate rather than ameliorate those behaviors
because the pricing mechanism in a liquid market may more easily and
quickly incorporate
information about litigation value than
commercialization value. In those circumstances, patents become inefficient
assets. Their value in a market fails to reflect the value of the underlying
technology. Market allocation of such assets may then be suboptimal from
the perspective of social welfare.
Patent markets may produce similarly indeterminate results with respect
to their second major function: allocating the various risks of innovation.
On~ one hand, giving inventors an option to sell their patents rather than
commercializing or enforcing them makes it far easier to earn a return, and
thereby to mitigate the market risk of invention. Market pricing can also
allow parties to mitigate infringement risk in a less costly manner than
through litigation. But patent markets may give rise to a particular moral
hazard problem in which inventors seeking only monetary returns no longer
have an adequate incentive to monitor patent quality. The result is a
dynamic not unlike that which affected markets for subprime mortgages and
their associated securities in the late aughts. A market for an inefficient
asset may simply produce more of that asset.
If we take seriously, then, both the analogy between patents and financial
assets and the normative goal of promoting innovation, the social value of
patent markets becomes ambiguous. The difficult policy problem is to
determine when one or another of these effects will dominate. That depends
on a number of factors that are likely to be context-specific. How good a
unit of technological exchange is a patent? How close is the fit in any given
industry between patents and technologies? How many and what kinds of
sellers and buyers are present in any given "sub-market" for a particular
technology? And so forth. Understanding the dynamics of any particular
patent market requires empirical research. This Essay therefore marks the
beginning rather than the end of the conversation about patent markets. It
offers a framework within which to carry out the difficult task of
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assembling empirical data. In the meantime, however, the theoretical
discussion at least supports two related conclusions. First, patent markets
are unlikely to be unqualified social goods. And, second, we therefore
should not abandon efforts to improve patent quality in the mistaken belief
that a well-functioning market will cure what ails our current system.
I.

NORMATIVE BASELINES

A necessary first step in assessing the desirability of patent markets is to
identify just what such markets are supposed to accomplish. The proponents
of strong patent markets appear to view efficiency in patent transactions as
the paramount normative goal. 36 To be sure, there are benefits to clearing
the market-to allocating all given assets to those who are willing to pay
market prices for those assets. But transactional efficiency is not the sole
goal either of the patent system or, for that matter, of modem capital
markets.
Begin with the patent system. The constitutional purpose of intellectual
property is "[t]o promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts." 37
Though debate over the proper aims and scope of the patent system is
legion, most agree that, at a minimum, it exists to promote innovation. 38
Patents can serve this purpose in several ways. 39 The classic justification for
patents is that they provide incentives to invest in innovation. 40 It is usually
thought that an unregulated market will under-supply innovation because it
is risky and expensive, but its product-information-is cheap and easy to
copy. 41 By conferring upon inventors the legal right to exclude others from
36. See, e.g., McDonough, supra note 31, at 216-18.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
38. See, e.g., SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 38 (2004) ("Intellectual
property protection gives innovators an incentive to invest in new knowledge."). Innovation is
the broader process of bringing new products and processes into the world, of which invention
is only a part. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 84
(2d ed. 1947).
39. For the purpose of this analysis, I put to the side non-utilitarian theories of patent law.
See generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011); William
Fisher, Theories ofIntellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
OF PROPERTY 168, 170-71 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). The development of robust, liquid
patent markets likely has little bearing on the policy conclusions that would follow from nonutilitarian theories.
40. See Fisher, supra note 39, at 178.
41. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INvENTIVE ACTMTY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 616-19 (1962); Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific
Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297, 302-04 (1959).
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their inventions, patents render appropriable otherwise ·rion-rivalrous and
non-excludable information. This is turn allows those inventors potentially
to recoup their investment in R&D, which would otherwise be free for
others to take. 42 The grant of exclusive rights in an invention comes with
social costs43 : the static deadweight loss that arises from pricing information
above its marginal cost (of zero), 44 and the dynamic social welfare losses
that arise because information is an input into the downstream production of
further information. 45 Most debates about the desirability of intellectual
property, or of changes to existing intellectual property law, attempt to
determine the magnitude of the tradeoff between these benefits and costs.
A variety of other potential justifications for patents have been proposed
within the basic utilitarian framework. 46 Most relevant for the analysis of
patent markets, and described in further detail below,47 is the idea that
patents play a role not only in invention but also in commercialization, the
process of bringing an inventive product from conception through
development to marketing. This justification is usually thought to have its
origins in the work of Edmund Kitch, who analogized patents to mining
claims, and argued that broad patents give their owners incentive to
max1m1ze their value by controlling their development and
cornrnercialization. 48 Contemporary accounts suggest two distinct roles
42. For standard accounts of the incentive theory of intellectual property, see, e.g.,
SCOTCHMER, supra note 38, at 34-38; Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual
Property, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1473, 1477-78 (A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shaven eds., 2007).
43. These costs are well summarized in Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property,
and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1058-59 (2005) ("First, intellectual property rights
distort markets away from the competitive norm, and therefore create static inefficiencies in the
form of deadweight losses. Second, intellectual property rights interfere with the ability of other
creators to work, and therefore create dynamic inefficiencies. Third, the prospect of intellectual
property rights encourages rent-seeking behavior that is socially wasteful. Fourth, enforcement
of intellectual property rights imposes administrative costs. Finally, overinvestment in research
and development is itself distortionary.").
44. See SCOTCHMER, supra note 38, at 36-37; Arrow, supra note 41, at 617.
45. See Arrow, supra note 41, at 618; Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of
Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30 (1991).
46. Two such justifications merit mention but not significant detail. One is disclosure.
Patents can facilitate the codification and distribution of useful information about the inventions
that are the subject of patent claims. See Jeanne C. Promer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV.
539, 541-42 (2009). The other is signaling, whereby patents serve as an indicator of value to
others. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Cm. L. REV. 625, 627-28 (2002). These
justifications are tangential to the impact of markets described here.
4 7. See infra Section II.A. I.
48. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 275-80 (1977).
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patents might play in facilitating innovation even after they issue. 49 They
can provide incentives for commercialization 50 or they can facilitate
linkages between inventors and sources of development expertise or
financing. 51 Debate regarding the former mostly mirrors the debate over
using patents to incentivize invention in the first instance. 52 There remain
serious questions about whether a commercialization market failure exists
and, if so, whether patents are the socially optimal solution to that market
failure. 53 As to the latter, I have argued in previous work that patents are not
necessary to facilitate the exchange of valuable information. 54 But as
described in Section II.A, there may be instances in which they are useful to
accomplish that goal, as loci for bargaining and for the exchange of tacit
knowledge.
The point here is not to resolve these questions. It is instead to highlight
the common normative backdrop: patents are not naturally occurring
phenomena with a value-neutral allocation scheme. 55 They are "government
interventions in the marketplace designed to achieve social policy ends." 56
They exist only to the extent that we continue to believe they produce more
social welfare gains in the form of increased innovation than social welfare
losses in denied access to those innovations. 57 Most debates about the patent
system today concern whether particular changes to the substantive or
49. For criticism of the theory that patents are justified by more than their ability to
incentivize invention in the first instance, see Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 131-32 (2004) [hereinafter
Lemley, Ex Ante].
50. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, The Danger of Underdeveloped Patent Prospects, 92
CORNELL L. REV. 1065, 1068-70 (2007); Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 341, 373-76 (2010). The incentive-to-commercialize theory of patents is not economically
distinct from the incentive-to-invent theory. See Michael J. Burstein, Reply-Commercialization
Without Exchange, 92 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 45, 46-49 (2014) [hereinafter Burstein, Reply].
51. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 785, 792 (2011); Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1477, 1519 (2005).
52. See Burstein, Reply, supra note 50, at 49-51.
53. Compare Abramowicz, supra note 50, at 1074-75, and Sichelman, supra note 50, at
348-49, with Lemley, Ex Ante, supra note 49, at 136-41, and Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the
Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 738-49 (2012).
54. See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property, 91
TEX. L. REV. 227,282 (2012) [hereinafter Burstein, Exchanging Information].
55. Cf Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought About Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent "Privilege" in Historical Context, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 1011-12
(2007) (situating patents in context ofnatural rights theory).
56. Mark A. Lemley, Taking the Regulatory Nature of IP Seriously, 92 TEX. L. REV. 107,
110 (2014).
57. Id.
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procedural rules governing patents will be better or worse for innovation.
There is no reason why the system for allocating patent rights should be
exempt from those debates. The question whether we should have liquid
markets for patents, in other words, ought to be judged by the same standard
as the question whether we should have patents at all.
What about financial markets? Here too, liquidity and efficiency are not
ends in themselves. Instead, the financial economics literature posits two
goals for financial markets: allocating assets to their highest value uses, and
allocating risk to the least-cost risk bearers. 58 Think, for instance, of futures
contracts. These are contracts in which one party promises to deliver a
certain amount of a commodity-say wheat, or copper-at a particular price
on a particular date. 59 When a contract is bought and sold, the market
allocates to the buying party both a claim to the underlying commodity and
the risk that the price of that commodity will change. 60 The asset and the
risk are allocated to the party that is willing to pay ·a particular price,
reflected in the market price of the contract, for those things. 61
Liquid markets aid this allocation in several ways. First, they provide
price information by aggregating the preferences of buyers and sellers as
expressed in market transactions. Second, they ensure the availability of
opportunities for welfare enhancing transactions. The more willing buyers
and sellers there are, the more likely it is that the socially optimal allocation
will be achieved. Third, they lower transaction costs. They make it easier
for buyers and sellers to find one another, thereby reducing "search costs."
And they lower the cost of generating information necessary for those
buyers and sellers to reach a negotiated bargain, usually by putting in place
mechanisms that make it easier for market participants to assess the value
and characteristics of the goods to be traded. 62 The important point,
however, is that these functions of markets are instrumental. Liquidity
makes it easier to transfer assets from one party to another. 63 But the social

58. See FABOZZI ET AL., supra note 8, at 4, 283. Indeed, capital markets are deemed
"complete" as a matter of theory, when one can invest capital in and insure against the risk of
every possible state of the world. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal
Allocation of Risk-Bearing, 31 REV. ECON. STUD. 91, 91 (1964); see also Ronald J. Gilson &
Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete
Capital Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 232-33, 232 n.7 (2008).
59. See FABOZZI ET AL., supra note 8, at 535.
60. Id. at 356-37.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 5-6.
63. See id. at 5.
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utility of markets is derivative of the social utility of the goods that trade on
them.
The view that market efficiency is instrumental rather than a good in
itself is reflected most clearly in the ongoing debates about financial
innovation. "Financial innovation" refers to the development of new
financial products such as derivatives, credit instruments, and various forms
of tradable securities used to allocate risk, and their incorporation into the
existing institutional structure of markets and intermediaries. 64 Were
efficiency in the purchase and sale of financial products the sole goal of
financial markets, . one would think that markets in complex financial
products would be generally unobjectionable. But a significant debate has
emerged, particularly following the financial crisis of 2008-09 about the
desirability of continued financial innovation. 65 In answering the question
whether one or another particular financial instrument is socially valuable,
participants in this debate usually draw a distinction between financial
markets and the "real economy."66 The latter comprises goods and services
that are the subject of trades; the former comprises those instruments that
are used either to fund the real economy or to guard against its risks. 67
Financial products, even if they are traded efficiently in a liquid market "are
socially beneficial when they help people insure risks" 68 or when they
allocate capital or commodities. But when they fail to carry out those
functions, trading in them amounts to "gambling [which] can instead be
socially detrimental."69 It stands to reason that liquid markets for socially
harmful products are themselves socially harmful.
Putting together the rationales for patents and for financial markets
yields a normative baseline for the analysis that follows. Liquid markets for
patents should be. evaluated based on the extent to which they promote
innovation. After all, if patents are justified only to the extent that they are
socially useful, it follows a fortiori that, markets in patents should only
exist if they are socially useful.
A well-functioning patent market would carry out two distinct tasks.
Like a market for futures contracts, as described above, or any other
64. See id. at 15-16; Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and
Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 62 (2011 ).
65. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, FINANCE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 12-14 (2012).
66. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA/or Financial Innovation: Applying
the Insurable Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First Century Financial Markets, 107 Nw. U.L. REV.
1307, 1313 (2013); see also FABOZZI ET AL., supra note 8, at 1-2.
67. See Posner & Weyl, supra note 66, at 1313-16.
68. Id at 1308.
69. Id.
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financial asset, it would allocate both the underlying asset and the risks
associated with that asset. A patent is a time-limited, exclusive right to
make, use, or sell a particular claimed invention. It is analogous to the
futures contract. The underlying asset is not a commodity like wheat, but
the invention that is the subject of the patent claims. 70 Assigning a patent to
a particular person, either the inventor, as current law does as an initial
matter, 71 or a subsequent market buyer, 72 allocates to that person both a
claim to the underlying invention and a set of risks associated with that
invention. A market for patents would allocate innovation's underlying
asset-technology-and the dual risks of innovation and infringement. The
next section will explore whether and how markets for patents might
achieve socially useful allocations of those things.
II.

EVALUATING PATENT MARKETS

This Section envisions a hypothetical patent market and evaluates how
well such a market might meet the normative goals described above. There
are a number of different ways in which one might imagine patents being
traded in a market. Patents could trade like stocks. To do so, they would
have to be made fungible. That is, one share of common stock is no
different from any other share of common stock; they are commodities. It
may be possible to structure, say, a holding company whose only asset was
a patent or a group of related patents, 73 and sell shares in that holding
company. More likely, however, is that patents will remain bespoke rather
than commoditized. That is, each patent is likely to remain unique and
distinct from each other patent. Markets in such goods nevertheless can
develop and function in predictable ways. The real estate market, for
example, is often a liquid market in differentiated goods. So too are markets
for certain financial products like derivatives.
To simplify the hypothetical patent market, I focus on three
characteristics that would obtain regardless of its particular structure. The
first is liquidity. The market would have enough willing buyers and sellers
of patents that most contemplated trades would be executed. The second is
price taking. No single player in the market would be so large as to unduly
70. Note that although the underlying asset is the invention, it can be difficult in practice
to separate the invention from the patent. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 3, at 310-11.
71. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 151-152 (2012) (presumption that patent is issued to inventor).
72. See id. § 261 (assignment ofownership).
73. Cf Risch, Patent Portfolios, supra note 28, at 104-05 (describing holding companies
for patent portfolios).
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influence the prices that the market generates. In other words, transactions
would take place at the market-clearing price. Third, there would be enough
institutional infrastructure to support transparency as to prices and
characteristics of transacted patents.
To be sure, there are many complications. Two merit a few further
words. First, in the contemporary, non-hypothetical market, many firms
build packages of related patents that may be traded as a group. 74 The
complementarity of patents in a portfolio often makes the value of the
whole greater than the sum of its parts. 75 This phenomenon makes patent
valuation particularly complicated, 76 and casts some doubt on whether
individual patents and portfolios ought to be treated similarly. 77
Nevertheless, although valuation may be different with respect to individual
or aggregated patents, the behavior of those two asset classes in a liquid
market is likely to be similar. Second, the institutional details-what kinds
of patents are being traded, who are buyers and sellers and what are their
characteristics, who are the market makers and what are the rules that they
set, how are trades recorded and publicized, and so on-do matter. 78 That
said, the analysis that follows is, for the most part, neutral with respect to
the institutional details.

A.

Allocating Technology

One function a liquid patent market could play is to facilitate the
exchange of useful technologies, helping to ensure that they wind up in the
hands of their highest value users. In other words, the market for patents is
like the market for secondhand goods. Patents usually are issued first to
inventors: But just like the secondary market for tangible goods allocates a
resource-vintage jeans, say-from an original to the subsequent user that
values it the highest, so too can a secondary patent market use price signals
to allocate technology to its highest and best use. More specifically, patent
markets can link inventors with sources of development skill and financial

74. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polle Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1,
27 (2005).
75. See id. ("[T]he real value of patents lies not in theirindividual significance, but instead
in their aggregation into a patent portfolio .... ").
76. See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 11, at 46-47.
77. See Risch, Patent Portfolios, supra note 28, at 102-03 (arguing that application of
securities laws to individual patents would be more costly than beneficial).
78. But cf FABOZZI ET AL., supra note 8, at 283-88 (describing structural variations
among different kinds of secondary capital markets).
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capital to do what the inventors themselves cannot: bring a product from the
laboratory to the shelf.
There is, however, a difference between markets for technology and
markets for patents. And arguments for the former may not always justify
the latter. It is blackletter patent law that patents are solely negative rightsthey are rights to exclude. 79 The simple analogy between markets for patents
and for tangible goods is therefore not quite right. It is the technology that is
analogous to the vintage jeans, not necessarily the patent. The underlying
technology is a resource that can be put to productive use; the patent is a
legally created right to prevent others from engaging in that use. When this
right to exclude is similar in scope to the underlying technology, then it can
aid in the technological exchange that I describe above. But when that fit is
imperfect, the risk of strategic behavior may become significant. And in that
case, the pricing function of liquid patent markets may not produce optimal
results.
1. Patents and the Market for Technology
An account of the positive impact of liquid markets for patents in
facilitating technological exchange begins with two premises: tech transfer
is important; and it is difficult to accomplish. A wave of recent scholarship
has emphasized the importance of commercialization. 80 Invention is merely
the beginning of a broader process of innovation, in which new ideas not
only are generated, but also are developed and brought to market. 81 Those
latter functions, which are what catalyze real social benefits, often require
skills that the initial inventor of a technology does not have. To bring those
skills to bear and turn an idea into a useful product, an inventor usually
must seek out others-development partners, product designers,
manufacturing engineers, and so on. And commercialization is costly; often
requiring more financial resources than inventors themselves may possess.
79. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010} ("[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
80. Edmund Kitch's work is often cited as the foundation of this line of inquiry. See Kitch,
supra note 48, at 267-71 (analogizing patents to mining prospects and arguing that exclusive
rights promote subsequent development). For more recent contributions, see, for example,
Abramowicz, supra note 50, at 1068-70; Camilla Alexandra Hrdy, Commercialization Awards,
2015 WIS. L. REV. 13, 29 (2015); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 717 (2001); Sichelman, supra note 50, at
373-76.
81. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 38, at 84; Sichelman, supra note 50, at 348-54.
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But contracting over technology is notoriously difficult. Kenneth Arrow
famously articulated a "fundamental paradox" that arises when parties try to
contract for the sale of information. 82 The buyer of information must be able
to place a value on the information and determine how much she is willing
to pay. But once the seller discloses the information, the buyer is in
possession of the subject of the trade and no longer has any reason to pay
for it. 83 Intellectual property is one way to solve the paradox. If the
information that parties want to trade is protected by a patent, then it can be
disclosed freely without fear of misappropriation. 84 "With suitable legal
measures," Arrow writes, "information may become an appropriable
commodity. " 85
In previous work, I have criticized the reflexive turn to intellectual
property to facilitate the exchange of valuable information. 86 Intellectual
property is not in fact necessary to accomplish technological exchange, 87
and often it is not sufficient either. 88 Solving the disclosure paradox
therefore does not offer an independent justification for intellectual property
and changes to the contours of existing IP doctrines for the sake of
facilitating transactions need to take account of the relative social welfare
costs and benefits of other means by which parties might successfully
engage in technological exchange. 89
All that said, there are circumstances in which patents can reduce the
transaction costs of technological exchange; and some circumstances in
which they may do so optimally when compared with the existing
alternatives. 90 Most straightforwardly, patents can solve the disclosure
paradox and create for the parties an identifiable res over which to
bargain. 91 As Kitch explains, patents "create[] a defined set of legal rights
known to both parties at the outset of negotiations." 92 The parties can then
82. Arrow, supra note 41, at 615.
83. Burstein, Exchanging Information, supra note 54, at 229; see Arrow, supra note 41, at
615.
84. See Burstein, Exchanging Information, supra note 54, at 229,229 n.5.
85. Arrow, supra note 41, at 615.
86. See Burstein, Exchanging Information, supra note 54, at 282.
87. See id at 274-76.
88. See infra notes 103-08.
89. See Burstein, Exchanging Information, supra note 54, at 262-74 (describing use of
selective revelation, contract- and norms-based strategies).
90. See id. at 278-79.
91. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing
Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 583-90
(2006).
92. Kitch, supra note 48, at 278.
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bargain for the allocation of those rights. Assuming that the scope of the
rights correlates with the scope of the technology, a transaction in the
former very closely approximates a transaction in the latter. There is some
historical evidence that patents played a significant role in establishing
markets for technologies. 93 Merges argues more specifically that patents
provide an especially effective form of "precontractual liability" that allows
parties to make disclosures of information not protected by a patent while
still holding_ negotiating partners liable for misappropriation of the related
information that fall within the boundaries of the patent claim. 94 Kieff
focuses on the notice function of the patent, arguing that as a public
document, it serves as a "beacon" to draw together interested
collaborators. 95
Patents can lower transaction costs even in the more common situation in
which they themselves are insufficient to complete the technology transfer.
Often the disclosure of the patent is not enough actually to practice the
technology. Much technology transfer, for example, requires not only the
transfer of patented knowledge, but also the transfer of tacit knowledge that
is critical to practicing the patent. Notwithstanding that patents are supposed
to be drafted in such a way as to "enable any person skilled in the art ... to
make and use the same,"96 the disclosure in the patent document is
frequently insufficient to allow full exploitation of the underlying
technology. 97 In that circumstance, different mechanisms such as personal
connections and organizational integration must facilitate the transfer of the
non-codified knowledge. 98 That knowledge is especially susceptible to the
moral hazard problem reflected in the disclosure paradox. 99 But patents can
potentially lower the transaction costs associated with tacit knowledge
93. See, e.g., B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INNOVATION: PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920, 314 (2005); Naomi R.
Lamoreaux, Kenneth L. Sokoloff & Dhanoos Sutthiphisal, Patent Alchemy: The Market for
Technology in US History, 87 Bus. HIST. REV. 3, 5 (2013).
94. See Merges, supra note 51, at 1488.
95. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, Coordination, Property, and Intellectual Property: An
Unconventional Approach to Anticompetitive Effects and Downstream Access, 56 EMORY L.J.
327, 333-34; see also Daniel F. Spulber, How Patents Provide the Foundation of the Market/or
Inventions, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 2 (describing several ways patents facilitate market
for including exclusion, transferability, disclosure, certification, standardization, and
divisibility), http://ssm.com/abstract=2487564.
96. 35 U.S.C. § l 12(a) (2012).
97. See Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1519-20 (2012).
98. See id. at 1521-40.
99. See ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF
INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 117-18 (2001).
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transfers by "exploiting the complementarity between know-how and any
other technology input that the licensor can use as a 'hostage,'" such as a
patent. 100 In that circumstance, the transferring party can threaten to
withhold the patented component of the technology, as it is legally entitled
to do, should the transferee party misappropriate the tacit knowledge. 101
To sum, the strong case that patents are necessary for technology transfer
is likely wrong, but there are circumstances in which patents will lower the
costs of such transfer. Now add a liquid market. Patent markets are likely to
reduce transactions costs further still because they act on different
dimensions of the costs of trade. In a liquid market, buyers and sellers are
transparent to one another. This lowers search costs, including both
"explicit costs, such as the money spent to advertise one's intention to sell
or purchase" the patents, and "implicit costs, such as the value of time spent
in locating a counterparty." 102 The presence of a large number of potentially
interested parties makes it much more likely that compatible inventors and
developers will find one another. A liquid market could also lower the
information costs associated with the transaction by standardizing
information across market participants. 103 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, liquidity would provide some measure of price information
that would ease the cost of negotiating from relatively uninformed
positions.
2. Patent Liquidity and Pricing
The dynamic described above is most likely to obtain when the transfer
of a patent enables the transfer of new and useful technology. 104 There are
two circumstances in which that might fail to occur. The first is when a
patent claims subject matter that is obvious or not novel. Such a patent
100. Id. at 116.
101. See id.; see also Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stem, The Product Market and the Market for
Ideas: Commercialization Strategies for Technology Entrepreneurs, 32 RES. POL'Y 333, 338
(2002).
102. See FABOZZI ET AL., supra note 8, at 6.
103. Id.
104. A note on nomenclature: I use "technology" here as "an imprecise term for useful
knowledge rooted in engineering and scientific discliplines, but also drawing from practice
experience with production." ARORA ET AL., supra note 99, at 3. It is well understood that there
is a difference between patents and marketed products. The distinction I draw here is somewhat
different. I posit that there are meaningful units of technological exchange-complete
technologies to be used in one or more product markets that can be the subject of transfer
between their inventors and third party sources of development expertise and financing that
need not necessarily correlate with products.
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should not have issued in the first place, and therefore does not transfer
technology that otherwise would have gone undeveloped. 105 An efficient
market for trading invalid rights merely exacerbates the social welfare
losses associated with those invalid rights. 106 I consider separately in
Section 11.B whether markets may offer a second-best solution to the
problem of "clearing" invalid patents.
But even valid and infringed patents may diverge from the scope of
economically useful technology. Patents can be too broad or too narrow.
When this happens, there is significant room for strategic behavior. Take
two common examples: software and biotech. Software claims are often
functional in nature and broad. 107 As a result, they tend to cover many
different technologies that parties might exchange. In biotech, the opposite
problem sometimes obtains. To the extent that biotech inventions are
unduly narrow in scope, technological exchange requires aggregation of
many different patents. 108 In either circumstance, patent holders have the
ability to extract rents arguably in excess of the value of the underlying
technology. 109 Both broad software patents and narrow biotech patents may
be components of larger technologies. Because the threat of injunctive relief
or of significant (sometimes treble) damages, patent holders of this sort
often have negotiating leverage. 110 And because of the cost and uncertainty
of litigation, patent holders often can extract nuisance value settlements.
The mismatch between patent scope and technological scope, in other
words, gives rise to many of the behaviors most associated with socially
costly patent trolling. 111
105. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard ofPatentability,
120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1597-98 (2011) ("Under a rigorously enforced inducement standard,
patents would cover only those innovations that otherwise would not be created or disclosedin other words, patents would cover only innovations that, without the patent system, would not
have been in the public domain.").
106. See Merges, supra note 34, at 1603 ("The market for patents unrelated to innovation
adds nothing to overall social welfare.").
107. See Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013
WIS. L. REV. 905, 940-41 (2013).
108. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, Ser., May 1998, at 698, 699.
109. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup].
110. See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396-97 (2006). In the
years since eBay, injunctions have become less frequent but they still offer patent plaintiffs
significant leverage ex ante. See FTC REPORT, supra note 12, at 215.
111. See Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and
Evidence in the Litigation ofHigh Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1577-82 (2009); Lemley
& Melamed, supra note 18, at 2146-53. This dynamic has not yet become widespread in
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Patents are notoriously difficult to value. This should be unsurprising in
light of the many contingencies described above that might affect the
amount and timing of cash flows that a patent can generate. 112 While the
standard economic analysis of financial assets posits that the value of the
asset is net present value of future cash flows, 113 figuring out how to take
the measure of those cash flows is difficult. Although professionals utilize
a variety of methods, 114 economists and legal scholars have focused
increasing attention on a concept of patents as options. 115 In this view, a
patent confers upon its holder "the right but not the obligation to make
further investments." 116 For the cost of procuring a patent (including the
R&D expense of the invention in the first instance), a patent holder can
obtain "the right, at various stages, to purchase a stream of expected cash
flows associated with excluding others from developing patented subject
matter. Patent holders can monetize this right by developing and
commercializing the patent and/or by litigating, or threatening to litigate,
the patent." 117 The value of the commercialization option will depend on the
cost of developing the invention, 118 the likelihood that the invention will be
successful, and the potential revenues that the invention may generate. 119
The litigation value depends on a different set of variables relating to the
likelihood of success and cost of enforcing the patent in court. 120 When
strategic behavior of the sort described above is possible, the value of the
expected cash flows from these two means of exercising the patent option
are likely to diverge even more significantly than in the ordinary case. That
is the cost of litigation may be dwarfed by the possibility of a large number
biotech, but there are numerous reasons to believe that it will be. See Robin Feldman & W.
Nicholson Price II, Patent Trolling: Why Bio & Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk, 17 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 773, 776-78 (2014).
112. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 52551 (2010) (describing common problems).
113. See FABOZZI ET AL., supra note 8, at 3 ("A basic economic principle is that the price of
any financial asset is equal to the present value of its expected cash flows, even if the cash flow
is not known with certainty.").
114. See, e.g., Perel, supra note 1, at 161-70.
115. See Martin & Partnoy, supra note 3, at 303; Cotropia, supra note 3, at 1129-35.
116. Cotropia, supra note 3, at 1132.
117. Martin & Partnoy, supra note 3, at 303.
118. Commercialization here can refer either to commercialization by the patent holder
alone or by her licensee. In either case, the option value of the patent is tied to the ultimate value
of the invention in the market. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 113 8.
119. As Martin and Partnoy write, "the expected cash flows associated with the patent are
only those incremental cash flows that would result from the producer's being able to exclude
others from selling the product." Martin & Partnoy, supra note 3, at 308.
120. See id. at 321-23.
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of judgments from a diverse set of defendants who are exposed to a broad
patent. 121
The difference between commercialization and enforcement is similar to
the distinction that some draw between ex ante transactions, which occur
"before the purchaser has obtained the technology through other means,"
and ex post transactions, which occur "after the firm accused of
infringement has invested in creating, developing, or commercializing the
technology." 122 My purpose here is not to engage the debate about the
social value of ex post transactions, but instead to ask whether a liquid
market is likely to allocate patents to parties whose primary aim is
commercialization or enforcement.
The answer to that question depends on which value will be reflected in
the market price on a liquid exchange. One of the main benefits of a liquid
market, as described above, is that it provides pricing data. The value of the
good is determined by the price at which willing buyers will engage in the
trade-the market-clearing price. In a liquid market, information cost is a
significant determinant of the market-clearing price. Because the
information costs associated with determining litigation value often may be
lower, market prices could more likely reflect litigation than
commercialization value. This in turn has significant implications for the
allocation of patent rights.
The starting point for figuring out how markets might price financial
assets is usually the efficient capital markets hypothesis. 123 In its most basic
form, the hypothesis states "that in a well-functioning securities market, the
prices of [securities] will reflect predictions based on all relevant and
available information." 124 More precisely, several forms of the theory posit
"informational efficiency"-a condition in which investors cannot expect to
make abnormal returns trading on information 125-with respect to several
different types of information. The "weak" form of the hypothesis holds
that market prices incorporate the most public of, information: previous
pricing information. The "semi-strong" and "strong" versions of the
121. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 1146--47.
122. See FTC REPORT, supra note 12, at 7-8 (emphases omitted); see also Robin Feldman
& Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137,
139 (2015) (finding that little NPE licensing activity results in technology transfer).
123. For a succinct overview, see generally Ross ET AL., supra note 25, at 332-59.
124. William F. Sharpe, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work: Discussion, 25 J. FIN. 418,418 (1970).
125. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial
Crisis: It's Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 VA. L. REV. 313, 321 (2014) [hereinafter
Gilson & Kraakman, After the Financial Crisis].
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hypothesis extend that characteristic to all publicly and privately available
information, respectively. 126
In a seminal contribution, Gilson and Kraakman described in detail the
mechanisms by which information influences market price. 127 In their
account, the incorporation of information into market price depends on the
initial distribution of that information. 128 That initial distribution is itself a
function of information costs. 129 If "capital market efficiency is a function of
information costs, then economizing on information costs pushes the capital
market in the direction of greater efficiency. " 130 That is to say, the market
will achieve greater efficiency with less costly information than more; it
will incorporate less costly information into prices more rapidly than more
costly information.
This analysis suggests that prices in a liquid patent market will more
rapidly
incorporate
information
about
litigation
value
than
commercialization value when the former is less costly than the latter, and
vice versa. It is difficult to predict which will be which, but in at least some
cases, litigation data will be easier to obtain. Consider first the sources of
information. Litigation documents, including and especially monetary
judgments, are public. The information necessary to make a reasonable
assessment of a patent's value in commercialization is highly private. The
calculation of a value is also likely to be easier (though, to be sure, not
necessarily easy) with respect to litigation. Assessing the strength of a
patent in court proceeds at least in the context of well-established legal
frameworks, even if the applicability of those frameworks to a particular
patent is contingent. Assessing commercialization value, on the other hand,
requires consideration of an enormous number of idiosyncratic variablespredictions about the likely market, whether the patent is being
commercialized by the inventor or by the inventor working in concert with
licensees, what the relative cost structure and competitive advantage of each
might be, and so forth. All this is another way of saying that it is easier to
generate litigation comparables than commercialization comparables.
Sophisticated parties already are using big data techniques to assess the
characteristics of litigated patents and make reasonable projections about

126. See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); see also Ross ET AL., supra note 25 at 337--41.
127. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Market Efficiency].
128. See id. at 567.
129. See id at 593-97.
130. Id at 597.
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how unlitigated patents might fare. 131 It is very difficult to undertake a
similar exercise for the commercialization scenario. "Because of the unique
nature of patents, the 'comparables' can always be distinguished." 132
Comparables become even more important for pricing in informationally
inefficient markets that trade in non-fungible assets. The efficient capital
markets hypothesis applies to markets in economic commodities, such as
common stock. 133 Price aggregation works best when the prices of a large
number of trades reflect the value of the same underlying asset. When those
assets start to become differentiated from each other, the market price tends
to reflect an estimate of value based on comparables. 134 Think of the real
estate market as an example, in which the sale price of a house depends in
no small part on the sale price of similar homes in similar geographies.
As described above, patents are quite different from one another; they
are bespoke rather than commoditized financial assets. There are
conceivable patent market structures that could achieve commoditization,
such as selling shares in a portfolio or in a holding company whose only
asset is a patent. 135 But because I want to remain neutral with respect to
market structure, 136 my use of the efficient capital markets hypothesis here
must necessarily be qualified: It is a hypothetical ideal. The less an actual
patent market resembles this ideal, the less informationally efficient it is
likely to be. Because even informationally efficient patent markets are
likely to incorporate some types of information more easily than others, less
efficient markets will a fortiori exhibit the same characteristics. Pricing in
most patent markets, then, will reflect estimates of the values of comparable
patents. Because comparables are often easier to obtain for litigation
outcomes than for commercialization outcomes, it is likely that litigation
value will dominate.
I do not claim that this analysis will hold true in all circumstances. One
variable that may affect pricing is the particular parties that comprise the

131. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283, 298
(2011 ). Indeed, this is the strategy that some defensive aggregators, such as RPX Corp., use to
determine which patents to purchase on behalf of their clients. See RPX Corp., Defensive
Aggregation, RPx RATIONAL PATENT, http://www.rpxcorp.com/rpx-services/rpx-defensivepatent-acquisitions/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
132. Anne Kelley, Practicing in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. Cm. L. REV. 115, 131
(2011).
133. See Ross ET AL., supra note 25, at 338; supra Part 11; cf Risch, Patent Porifolios,
supra note 28, at 104-'.-05.
134. See Kelley; supra note 132, at 129-30.
135. See Risch, Patent Porifolios, supra note 28, at 102-03.
136. See supra Part II; Risch, Patent Porifolios, supra note 28, at 102-03.
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market. Gilson and Kraakman describe the roles that various intermediaries
play in the securities markets. They argue that different institutions are
equipped to handle different sorts of information costs. The rate of
incorporation of information therefore depends not only on the nature of the
information cost but also on the characteristics of the institutions that
operate in the market. 137 In patent markets, it is possible that even high cost ,..
information can be incorporated into the market price if the intermediaries
are sufficiently able to process that information. Non-practicing entities in
the current market, for example, are often praised for their ability to assess
the value of patents. 138 But they most often do so on the basis of litigation
value, because their expertise lies in patent enforcement and their function
is akin to providing litigation finance. 139 But if the market becomes
populated with operating companies that have expertise in
commercialization, it stands to reason that they may make different
assessments that feed into the market price.
A second variable is the possibility that developments in the law of
patent damages might result in greater convergence between
commercialization and litigation values. To the extent that the calculation of
a "reasonable royalty" 140 more closely mirrors the economic contribution of
the patent to an infringing device or process, then the litigation outcome
should more closely mirror the commercialization outcome. 141 But there wjll
likely still be circumstances where, because of strategic behavior, the
divergence in value is insurmountable. 142
Ultimately, a liquid market that tends to price patents at their litigation
value will tend to allocate those patents to parties who are more likely to
realize that value through enforcement. There are reasons to think that
137. See Gilson & Kraakman, Market Efficiency, supra note 127, at 613-21.
138. See, e.g., Osenga, supra note 32, at 452-53 ("Patent licensing companies, by virtue of
their full-time status as intermediaries and repeat players in the market, are in a better postion to
evaluate patents. Because of their repeat presence in the market, they gain specialization and
experience in assessing patent value that individual inventors and small companies are generally
unable to obtain.").
139. See Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 11, at 62; cf Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright
Infringement Markets, 113 C0LUM. L. REV. 2277, 2286 (2013) (defending copyright markets on
litigation finance grounds).
140. 35 u.s.c. § 283 (2015).
141. See, e.g., Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Structured Approach to Calculating
Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 642 (2010); Golden, supra note 112, at
508-09; Jorge L. Contreras & Richard J. Gilbert, A Unified Framework for RAND and Other
Reasonable Royalties 6-7 (Univ. of Utah Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 91, 2015),
http://ssm.com/abstract=2502066.
142. See Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 109, at 2008-09.
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allocation is suboptimal from the perspective of social welfare. Direct
consumer welfare benefits come from commercialization, from bringing
new technologies to market. Patent litigation is not inherently suspect, and
indeed is the vehicle through which the benefits of the right to exclude are
realized. But "[w ]hen a company commercializes technology that it
invented independently and later faces a patent assertion," the resulting
judgment or license "provides no direct benefit to consumers." 143 Such
assertions, moreover, increase commercializing entities' costs, leading some
to argue that they are amount to a tax on innovation or to pure rent
seeking. 144 Similarly, I do not mean to suggest that litigation or
commercialization value is the "correct" price of a patent. 145 The economic
value of a patent is generally understood to be the difference between the
value of the patented technology and the next best alternative, assuming a
free choice between the two. 146 The litigation value is likely to diverge
farther from the economic value. This means that in a liquid market, a
patent is likely to be an inefficient asset-it may fail to reflect the
underlying value of the technology.
Notwithstanding the discussion above, I make no attempt to resolve here
the question whether commercialization or litigation is more socially useful
or reflect more clearly the economic value of a patent. My point here is
more limited: the operation of a liquid patent market could bring about a
particular allocation of patents among the actors in the market that results in
a very different patent system from that which we currently enjoy. It means
a shift from a system in which the right to exclude is allocated to the
inventor to a system where the right to exclude is allocated to the highest
bidder, who may then be incentivized to realize that value through
enforcement. The implications of this system are complex. Suffice it to say
that allocating patent rights solely through operation of the price system

143. See FTC REPORT, supra note 12, at 52.
144. See id. at 53; Collen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461,
465 (2014). The magnitude of this tax may be significant. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J.
Meurer, The Direct Costs.from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 387,416 (2014). And there
is little evidence that ex post patent assertions lead to real technology transfer. See Feldman &
Lemley, supra note 122.
145. Indeed, as Gilson and Kraakman explain, the efficient capital markets hypothesis was
never meant to conflate informational efficiency with "fundamental efficiency." Properly
understood, the hypothesis says nothing about whether markets will achieve correct pricing. See
Gilson & Kraakman, After the Financial Crisis, supra note 125, at 321-26.
146. See Contreras & Gilbert, supra note 141, at 12-14, 35; Durie & Lemley, supra note
141, at 637; cf Gilson & Kraakman, After the Financial Crisis, supra note 125, at 322-23
(fundamental value of a security is discounted cash flow).
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may bring about a host of socially undesirable results. 147 At the very least,
we need to think through whether and how such a system would continue to
satisfy our normative priors.

B.

Allocating the Risks ofInnovation

The second function of capital markets is to allocate risk, and here too
the analogy yields mixed results when applied to patent markets. There are
two kinds of risk that a liquid market could help to mitigate. The first is the
"market risk" associated with innovative activity, and the second is
"infringement risk" associated with others' patenting. A liquid market for
patents could in theory allow inventors to relieve themselves of the risk of
commercialization or litigation, while simultaneously allowing potential
infringers to bargain for an efficient allocation of litigation risk. But it. is
also possible that liquid patent markets could create more risk rather than
less, either by drawing into the system patents that otherwise would be
rationally under-enforced, or by skewing inventive activity towards
patentability. Both of these effects occur because of the same inefficiencies
in pricing discussed in the previous part. This leads to a conclusion that has
been recognized elsewhere with respect to other markets: a liquid market
for an inefficient asset may wind up producing more of the asset.
1. Reducing Market and Infringement Risk
Innovators face two different kinds of risks arising from their activities.
The first is the risk associated with invention writ large. Invention is highly
uncertain. Most inventions fail to become marketable products. 148 So while
it is true that a patent provides an incentive to invent insofar as it mitigates
the risk of misappropriation of one's invention by others who can copy it,
the patent does nothing to mitigate ordinary market risk. The vast majority
of inventors earn little to no return on their investment simply because there
is no one else willing to license or develop the invention protected by the
patent. This is so, by the way, across the spectrum of inventors, from

147. See Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. REV. 970, 984 (2012).
148. See Sichelman, supra note 50, at 362-64, 362 n.121 (aggregating and reporting survey
data and other metrics that suggest "that less, probably much less, than half of all patented
product inventions are commercialized").
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individuals to startup companies to established ~nterprises. Much of
corporate R&D fails as well. 149
Relatedly, even if there is economic value to a patent, inventors often
cannot themselves capture that value through litigation. Litigation, of
course, is costly, time consuming, and uncertain. 150 Many inventors lack the
funds or ability to bring infringement actions. And even those who do may
find the decision to invest in litigation to have negative net present value.
The ability to sell a patent into a liquid market potentially helps to cure
these defects.
Most straightforwardly, because a liquid market could lower search and
information costs, as described above, 151 there is a better chance that patent
holders who are not themselves in a position to commercialize or to litigate
are more likely to find a partner who is. A liquid market might also, though,
create more opportunities for patent holders to sell. There are a number of
reasons why willing buyers might offer money in return for patents that
cannot otherwise be monetized in the hands of their original inventors. It
might be that a buyer with an existing portfolio will value a patent that is
complementary to its existing holdings differently than a sole patent
holder. 152 Other sources of liquidity might base their business models
expressly on risk management. Mhyrvold sometimes describes Intellectual
Ventures in these terms. 153 One of the benefits of a portfolio strategy is that
it diversifies the cash flow returns from a large number of patents. 154 The
value of the portfolio is less dependent on the cash flows from any
particular patent. And given that most patents are valueless, 155 portfolios'
performance is dependent largely on particularly valuable outlier patents. It
is a rational strategy in this model to invest small sums of money in a large
number of patents, most of which will fail to produce revenue, but a small

149. See id.
150. Patent litigation even more so. In 2011, the average cost of a patent lawsuit from
complaint to judgment was about six million dollars per side. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP.
LAW Ass'N, 2011 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY, at 1-151-56 (2011),
http://www.aipla.org/leamingcenter/library/books/econsurvey/2011/Pages/Table-ofContents.aspx.
·
151. See ARORA ET AL., supra note 99, at 116; FABOZZIET AL., supra note 8, at 6; Gans &
Stem supra note 101; supra Section II.A. 1.
152. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 74, at 32-37.
153. See Myhrvold, supra note 4 ("What we're really trying to do is create a capital market
for inventions akin to the venture capital market that supports start-ups and the private equity
market that revitalizes inefficient companies.").
154. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 74, at 37-41.
155. See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 440-41 (2004).
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number of which will produce outsized returns. 156 Entities that engage in
this strategy therefore tend to be lower cost risk bearers than individuals or
undiversified operating companies.
Furnishing inventors with an option to sell, in addition to the options to
commercialize and litigate, 157 thus reduces each individual inventor's risk
with respect to the likely cash flows from her patent. 158 This in tum arguably
furnishes additional incentive to invent. 159 If inventors have greater
assurance that they can achieve a return on their investment in inventive
activity, they are more likely to undertake that activity. Because providing
an incentive to invent is one of the core justifications for the patent
system, 160 liquid patent markets may be normatively desirable.
Along similar lines, a number of scholars have written about how patents
can promote specialization in the innovation value chain. 161 Arora and
Merges, for example, argue that patents "make it possible for technologyintensive inputs to be supplied by separate firms" through the process of
market exchange. 162 "This, in turn, contributes to the viability of these
specialized firms as standalone entities." 163 It stands to reason that
improving the efficiency of exchange transactions through a liquid market
lowers the transaction costs associated with specialization, and may
contribute to easier specialization. 164 And there is some historical evidence
that, in fact, liquid secondary markets contributed to the growth of
specialized "invention firms." 165 To the extent that specialization promotes
efficiency in innovation-and to the extent that we believe smaller firms to
156. See Myhrvold, supra note 4 ("A single invention is typically very risky. However, if
you build (as my company has) a diversified portfolio of tens of thousands of inventions that
span a wide range of technologies, the aggregate risk becomes quite manageable.").
157. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
158. One common complaint about current patent markets is that they function primarily to
monetize patents for creditors when patent-heavy firms go bankrupt. See, e.g., FTC REPORT,
supra note 12, at 70. But see Risch, supra note 19, at 489-90 (finding that most NPE patents are
not obtained in bankruptcy transactions). Providing a backstop for bankrupt firms is another
way to reduce risks; I do not attempt to compare the welfare effects of providing this backstop
prior to bankruptcy.
159. See Khan, supra note 32; Spulber, supra note 95, at 5.
160. See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property
Rights, and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 542 (2004).
162. Id. at 452.
163. Id.; see also Barnett, supra note 51, at 790-93; Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Law and the Boundries ofTechnolog-Intensive Firms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1649,
1658-72 (2009).
164. See Myhrvold, supra note 4.
165. See Khan, supra note 32, at 832-35.
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be more dynamic and innovative-then liquid patent markets may help to
promote innovation through this mechanism as well. 166
The second kind of risk arising from patents is infringement risk. Patents
are "probabilistic." 167 They are of uncertain validity and uncertain
boundaries. As to the former, although patents enjoy a presumption of
validity when they issue, 168 validity is not conclusively established until
patents are tested in litigation. Empirical evidence suggests that this
uncertainty is significant-some studies find that upwards of 45% of
patents litigated to final judgment are found to be invalid. 169 The scope of
even valid patents is also highly uncertain, and subject to the vagaries of
claim construction, arguably the most contentious and difficult to predict
aspects of patent litigation. 170
This uncertainty means that an issued patent presents a risk of
infringement to those working in the same field as the patent. Patents
purport to cordon off a range of activities that persons are not supposed to
engage in without a license from the patentholder. 171 But because it is not
clear either that those persons in fact cannot engage in the subject matter of
the patent (i.e. that the patent is valid) or that those persons' activities are in
fact within the exclusive right protected by the patent (i.e. that the
boundaries are clear), it is very difficult to plan innovative investments.
Often, innovative activity can be chilled by the mere presence of a patent,
even if it is more likely than not that the activity can proceed. 172 This is
especially true in view of the fact that investments in innovation need to be
made over time, with the result of that innovation itself uncertain at the end
of the investment period.
A liquid patent market might help mitigate this uncertainty by allowing
the market for patents to clear. In a market where pricing is determined in
166. But see infra Section 11.B.2 (questioning whether liquid patent markets will produce
more innovation or more patents).
167. See Lemley & Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, supra note 24, at 76.
168. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2015) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
169. See John R. Allison et al., Our Divided Patent System, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1099
(2015).
170. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson & Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical,
Empirical, and Normative Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 4
(2013).
171. See Mark A. Lemley, The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 109,
110 (2013) (describing a patent as a "regulatory intervention in the marketplace that is designed
to restrict what people can do with their own ideas and their own property'').
172. See Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 498, 532-33 (2015); Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effect of Unenforced
Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 115-117 (2006).
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no small part by litigation value, 173 entities can assess their exposure and, if
it makes economic sense, mitigate their risk of infringement by buying the
patent at the market clearing price rather than relying upon the vagaries of
litigation. 174 Some defensive aggregators adopt this strategy as a business
model. 175 Their clients invest in a fund that the aggregator uses to buy
patents that pose a risk to the clients; the value proposition to clients is that
the aggregator therefore clears infringement risk at a lower cost than in
litigation. 176 (And, from the perspective of the patent owner, this market
provides a far easier way to enforce her patent).
One objection to this purported benefit is that perhaps we do not want
the market for invalid patents to clear. Transactions over exclusive rights
that ought not to have issued in the first place are socially wasteful. Merges,
for example, writes, "[t]he market for patents unrelated to innovation adds
nothing to overall social welfare." 177 He analogizes invalid patents to the
market for blackmail. 178 In such a market, the person who has damaging
info'rmation and the person against whom the information may be used both
be:aefit from a voluntary transaction in which the blackmailer gets paid, and
the blackmailee does not suffer reputational harm. But it can hardly be said
to improve social welfare. So too, the patent holder is made better off in a
market transaction for her patent, and the potential infringer may buy patent
peace at a lower price than the cost of litigation. But it is not clear this
transaction is welfare enhancing.
The answer to this objection lies in weighing the cost of clearing the
market for bad patents against the cost of reducing the prevalence of bad
patents in the first instance. The United States Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") received almost 600,000 patent applications in 2013, and issued
over 300,000 patents. 179 There is no reason to believe that these numbers
will decline any time soon. At that volume, it is extremely costly for the
PTO to ensure that every issued patent is valid. Indeed, Mark Lemley has
long argued that the PTO is "rationally ignorant" in applying a relatively
light screen to patent applications. 180 This is because most patents are never
173. See supra Section 11.A.2.
174. See Lemley & Myhrvold, supra note 6, at 258.
175. Hagiu & Yoffie, supra note 11, at 56-58.
176. See, e.g., id.
177. Merges, supra note 34, at 1603.
178. See id. at 1588, 1600-01.
179. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
143 (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2014PAR.pdf.
180. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV.
1495, 1497 (2001).
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the subject of litigation or licensing, so pose little social cost other than the
cost of prosecution. 181 Those patents which prove valuable enough to assert
are then adjudicated more closely in litigation. 182
As patent litigation, particularly as practiced by patent assertion entities,
has grown, one of the common refrains has been to tighten standards at the
PTO, to ensure that it issues fewer invalid or overbroad patents. 183 Congress
has also authorized a set of administrative procedures in the PTO-"inter
parties review" and "post grant review"-that appear to be viable avenues
for challenging the validity of issued patents at a lower cost than through
litigation. But the market solution described above may prove less socially
costly. In other words, it might be the case that the market can clear bad
patents at a lower overall social cost than PTO reform aimed at ensuring
more rigorous examination of every patent. If the patent market clears risk
at a market clearing price, then perhaps we do not have to worry about an
oversupply of bad patents. The optimal solution to the problem of bad
patents, of course, depends on the magnitude (and distribution) of the
relative social costs.
2. Increasing Systemic Risk
It is also possible, however, that liquid patent markets could create more
risk rather than less. There are two ways this could occur: First, the market
could draw into the system patents that otherwise would have gone
unenforced. Second, the market can encourage the production of more
patents and, potentially, lower quality patents. The overall social welfare
calculus depends on whether the benefits of risk reduction described above
outweigh the costs of risk creation discussed below.
To begin, consider the flip side of Lemley's "rational ignorance"
argument. The logic of tolerating a light screen at the PTO depends upon
rational under-enforcement. 184 That is, it is rational to allow litigation to
screen invalid patents rather than administrative processes only when it
remains true that relatively few patents are asserted. If patent assertions

181. Id.
182. See id. at 1501-03; see also David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual
Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677, 693-704 (2012).
183. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L.
REV. 2135, 2139-45 (2009).
184. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Costs and Unlicensed Use of Patented Inventions,
78 U. CHI. L. REV. 53, 62 (2011).
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begin to rise, then the social cost of invalid patents rises relative to the cost
of screening out those patents.
Enter liquid markets. One potential effect of increasing liquidity is
simply that more patents are now the subject of transactions than
previously. As described above, the welfare effects of drawing more patents
into the system this way are ambiguous. Of perhaps somewhat greater
concern, more patents could wind up in litigation than in the absence of a
liquid market. As described in Section II.A, when the fit between patents
and technologies is imperfect, a liquid market may favor allocating patents
based on their litigation value, and to those who are more likely to choose
enforcement over commercialization or other options. 185 This means that
patents traded on the market may disproportionately come to be held by
entities who choose to realize the asset's predicted cash flows through
litigation. The result, in tum, may be more patent litigation rather than less.
More troublingly, a liquid patent market would likely impact the primary
behavior of innovators, skewing inventive activity toward patentability.
There are a couple of ways in which this could be problematic. For one
thing, inventors may find it more cost effective to rely on patent protection
to appropriate the gains from their R&D investments than other less socially
costly mechanisms for securing a return. Society could then be getting the
same amount of innovation at a higher social cost. Alternatively, the
attractiveness of securing a return on patentable inventions by selling the
underlying patent into a liquid market could induce inventors to shift their
activities toward things that are patentable rather than not, even where the
latter may be more socially valuable. 186 This is a variation of the familiar
argument that stronger patents rights yield not more innovation, but more
patents. 187 Greater liquidity may, in some circumstances, generate more
patents rather than more innovation.
How might this occur? Intuitively, the ability to monetize patents easily
by selling them into a liquid market may lure more inventors to file more
patents with a more secure expectation of garnering a return. More
specifically, in the option calculation described above, 188 a sale option is
185. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
186. See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum ofExcludability and the Limits of
Patents, 122 YALEL.J.1900, 1943-44 (2013).
187. See, e.g., Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Recent Research on the Economics of
Patents, 4 ANN. REV. ECON. 541, 547 (2012); Mariko Sakakibara & Lee G. Branstetter, Do

Stronger Patents Induce More Innovation? Evidence From the 1988 Japanese Patent Law
Reforms, 32 RAND J. ECON. 77, 78 (2001); Josh Lerner, 150 Years of Patent Protection, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 221, 221 ( 2002).

188. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
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likely to dominate the litigation and commercialization options because it is
vastly more certain.·
But there is a deeper problem with which the financial economics
literature is familiar: moral hazard. Consider the growth of a secondary
market for securities and derivatives of subprime mortgage loans in the
mid-aughts. In this market, originators of mortgage loans-the banks that
lent the initial capital to potential homeowners with poor credit-often
packaged and sold financial instruments based on the underlying loans to
third parties. When the extent of credit risk represented by those
instruments became apparent, and the underlying mortgage loans began to
default with greater frequency, this secondary market collapsed and the
holders of the securities and derivatives faced significant losses when they
were unable to liquidate their holdings for nearly the amount they paid. 189
The "dominant" explanation for the growth, and eventual collapse, of the
subprime mortgage market is the "originate to distribute"· theory. 190 Prior to
the mid-2000s, most mortgage financing followed an "originate to hold"
model, in which mortgage lenders held at least some substantial portion of
the loans they issued for the duration of those loans. 191 This was especially
true for subprime loans, which generally could not be sold to the
government-sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The
development of a secondary market for subprime mortgages changed this
dynamic, and the originators' business model increasingly shifted from one
in which they kept their subprime loans on their own books to one in which
they sold the loans in the secondary market to third-party buyers. 192 The
moral hazard arose because originators, no longer residual claimants to the
securities they packaged and sold, had no incentive to keep up their
underwriting standards. They could originate highly risky loans because,
once sold, they were no longer exposed to that risk. As a result, the quality
of underwriting went down, and more and more risky loans entered the
market. 193 To be sure, this explanation for the financial crisis is not without

189. See Gilson & Kraakman, After the Financial Crisis, supra note 125, at 333-38.
190. GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISABLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 136-38
(2010).
191. Amiyatosh Purnanandam, Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis, REV. FIN. STUD. 1881, 1881-82 (2010),
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/6/1881.full. pdf.
192. See id. at 1899-90; see also ROBERT POZEN, Too BIG TO SAVE? How TO FIX THE U .s.
FINANCIAL SYSTEM 18 (2009).
193. See Pumanandam, supra note 191, at 1897.
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its critics. 194 But there is good empirical evidence to support the link
between moral hazard and declining underwriting standards. 195
This dynamic maps well onto the participants in liquid patent markets.
When inventors are active participants in ongoing innovation, they often
face infringement risk commensurate with the risk they themselves
generate. That is, practicing entities that produce patents may, by virtue of
practicing in the relevant art, expose themselves to a risk of infringing
others' patents. 196 While it is true that every patent holder has an incentive
to draft her patent as broadly as possible, inventors who are exposed to
symmetric risk have a countervailing incentive to monitor patent quality.
This may be so at the retail level, wherein patentees will try to file
applications that they are reasonably sure are valid and cover a range of
technologies in order both to maximize their own chance of recovery and to
have a strong counter-patent to use if they are sued. And it can also be true
at the wholesale level. Witness attempts by many software companies to
reform the law governing software patents.
If inventors can sell patents into a market in which they are no longer
active participants-in which they no longer themselves have an interest in
commercializing, or in which they no longer themselves face a symmetric
risk of infringement liability from others-then their incentive ·is not to
monitor patent quality. It is instead to put plausible patents into the market
without regard to whether they are sure bets either in commercialization or
in litigation. Indeed, to the extent that a liquid patent market aids in the
formation of a completely distinct "invention" sector, 197 participants in that
sector will likely face incentives to generate and sell patents at a rapid clip.
After all, that is the primary source of revenue generation in the business
194. See, e.g., GORTON, supra note 190, at 144; Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep Sengupta,
Subprime Loan Quality 2--4 (Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper 2008-036E, 2011).
Interestingly, the leading alternative theory holds that the more significant problem was not
moral hazard, but asymmetric information that prevented the purchasers of subprime mortgagebacked securities from fully understanding what they had bought. As discussed supra, this
problem is even more pronounced with respect to liquid patents because patents are likely to be
harder to value than subprime mortgages. Supra notes 117-26 and accompanying text.
19 5. See Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from
Subprime Loans, 125 Q.J. ECON. 307, 309-13 (2010); Pumanandam, supra note 191, at 1897;
Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitization 33-38 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 18611, 2012) (reviewing literature).
196. See Chien, supra note 144, at 472-73. This dynamic has been similarly cited as a
reason why the patent assertion entity business model succeeds. Because such entities do not
themselves practice any inventions that might subject them to a risk of suit, they are immune to
potential countersuits by their infringement defendants. The resulting asymmetry in litigation
cost compels a higher rate of settlement. See id.
197. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
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model. The result could be more and lower quality patents. This may
expand rather than reduce the overall level of risk in the patent system.
III.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Applying the logic of financial economics to the patent system yields
ambiguous results, at least as a matter of theory. Patent markets could lower
search costs and generate pricing information that leads to more efficient
transactions in technology, which everyone agrees is of great importance in
fostering innovation up and down the supply chain. But where the fit
between patents and technologies is imperfect, the patent becomes an
inefficient unit of exchange and a liquid market could lead to significant
strategic behavior. And while patent markets may help reduce both market
risk and infringement risk to innovators, the financial economics literature
tells us that a liquid market for an inefficient asset could simply result in the
production of more of that asset.
Broadening the lens, this result should not be surprising. There are times
when we think markets work well to allocate resources, and times when we
think they do not. Stock markets, despite their flaws, generally do a good
job allocating capital and diversifying risk. But we tend not to rely on
markets to allocate other kinds of goods, particularly when we are
concerned with distributive effects and moral hazard. The purchase and sale
of human organs, for instance, is banned almost worldwide. And for good
reason. It is commonly thought that, left to its own devices, a market for
kidneys would crowd out altruistic donation, decrease supply, and increase
prices with severe consequences for poor recipients, or would result in
coercion of poor sellers with no reasonable economic alternative. 198
By now I have, perhaps overwhelmingly, analogized a hypothetical
patent market to markets for stocks, 199 real estate,2°0 vintage jeans, 201
subprime mortgages, 202 and kidneys. 203 There is good reason to invoke all of
these disparate markets: the patent market might look like one or all of
them, depending on factors that are likely to be context-specific. It is well
understood that the patent system, though nominally unitary, in fact often
198. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Transplant Tourism: The Ethics and Regulation of
International Markets for Organs, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 269, 273-74 (2013).
199. See supra notes 73, 137-39 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 190-96 and accompanying text.
203. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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functions differently in different technological and business contexts. 204 As
the discussion above demonstrates, the same is likely to be true of patent
markets. The operation of patent markets will be industry- and technologyspecific. It will depend on the fit between patents and technologies, on the
characteristics, economics, and business plans of the sources of liquidity
and potential sellers in any given sub-market, and on the legal environment
as well. Determining with any certainty whether a liquid patent market is
socially useful in a particular context requires empirical research into the
factors listed above and others. This Essay therefore cannot be predictive. I
seek instead to open an agenda for research into the workings of nascent
patent markets and their evolution, using the theoretical discussion herein as
a framework and a guide.
The demonstrable need for a more nuanced understanding of patent
markets calls into question the seemingly common assumption that patent
markets are socially useful and that the only relevant policy question
remains how to improve their function. It also puts the lie to the argument
that if only we could make patent markets more robust and liquid, then the
market would cure all that ails the patent system. It may be that the ongoing
"financialization" of the patent system is useful in some contexts, but it
cannot be a panacea for the problems that the patent system faces. In real
terms, two conclusions follow. First, we should continue to make reforms to
the patent system that are unambiguously useful and that may improve the
operation of markets as well. Improving the notice function of patents is one
such reform. But, second, we should not give up on reforms outside the
context of markets in the hope that they will prove unnecessary. This is
especially true with respect to patent quality. It is not clear that a market
will eliminate bad patents at low social costs, and there is reason to think
that the opposite result may in fact occur. Patent reform aimed at lowering
the number of invalid patents or at better aligning the substantive standards
of patent law to the innovation market failures it is supposed to correct will
remain critically important.

204. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 49 (2009); Allison et al., supra note 155.

